Above photo: Kenyan police gather during tax hike protest in March 2023. Yasuyoshi Chiba / AFP.
On Monday, October 2, 2023, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2699 authorizing a non-UN Multinational Security Support (MSS) force for Haiti. The resolution, adopted under UN Charterâs Chapter VII, was drafted by the United States and Ecuador. This Resolution represents the successful implementation of phase one Washingtonâs â10-Year Strategy for Haiti.â An U.S.-led invasion and 10 year occupation of Haiti is now imminent.
Phase two of the â10-Year Strategic Plan for Haitiâ was implemented in the summer of 2023. Phase two seeks to build a network of at least 250 U.S.-funded âcivil societyâ organizations to influence public policy and decision-making as Washington oversees the reconstruction of Haitiâs state institutions and government.
The consequences of Washingtonâs â10-Year Strategic Plan for Haitiâ would be comparable to the 1915 American invasion and occupation of Haiti. If Washington gets its way, Haiti will turn from its current status as a U.S. neo-colony back into a virtual colony, as it was under U.S. Marine rule from 1915 to 1934.
Washingtonâs Global Fragility Act
Passed with full bipartisan support under President Donald Trump in 2019, the Global Fragility Act (GFA) was initially framed by proponents as an âan opportunity to drive the necessary changeâ to prevent âadversaries such as China and Russia to expand their influence.â
The U.S. government selected Haiti to be the first âpartnerâ under the GFA. Also on the list are Libya, Mozambique, and Papua New Guinea, along with West Africaâs Benin, CĂŽte dâIvoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo.
The GFA follows the â2017 National Security Strategyâ that will work to âstrengthenâ so-called âfragile states⊠where state weakness or failure would magnify threats to the American homeland.â
The GFA aims to prevent âfragile statesâ from developing diplomatic and trade relationships with Russia and China. In a 2021 speech, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken described China as âthe only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open international system â all the rules, values, and relationships that make the world work the way we want it to.â
This adversarial stance on China results from its rapprochement with âfragile statesâ which involves geo-strategic concerns, including access to raw materials.
In a major policy speech in Seoul in 2022, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen explained that the U.S. âcannot allow countries like China to use their market position in key raw materials, technologies, or products to disrupt our economy and exercise unwanted geopolitical leverage.â
Haiti has mineral resources, primarily gold, valued at an estimated US$20 billion. It is unclear, however, whether these mineral resources can be extracted at a profit.
Washington also wants to prevent Haiti from developing closer diplomatic relations and economic ties with Russia. Jovenel MoĂŻse, who was assassinated two years ago, established formal diplomatic relations with Moscow only one month before his assassination, accrediting Russian ambassador Sergey Melik-Bagdasarov. It was the first time Haiti had established diplomatic relations with Russia. Many argue that this could have been a factor which led Washington to green-light MoĂŻseâs assassination.
Meanwhile, Haiti remains one of only 11 nations (not counting the Vatican) out of 193 worldwide which recognize Taiwan as an independent nation, the so-called âRepublic of China.â The Peopleâs Republic of China has sought to woo Haiti to drop Taiwan and formally establish diplomatic relations with it, just as the neighboring Dominican Republic did in 2018.
A âpartnershipâ under the GFA between Haiti and Washington would ensure that Haiti remains under U.S. hegemony for decades. This would also block diplomacy and investment from countries like China. In 2017, China offered to overhaul Port-au-Princeâs crumbling infrastructure with a US$4.7 billion aid package if Haiti would recognize it and join its âOne Belt, One Road Initiative.â
So far that hasnât happened, and the GFA aims to keep things that way. It is a plan to maintain global hegemony and gather former colonies and neo-colonies under its wing.
It is no wonder that Washington chose Haiti as its first âpartnerâ under the GFA. Haiti is often the laboratory where Washington tests its new imperialist strategies for maintaining hegemony.
Washingtonâs â10-Year Security Assistanceâ Program
The GFA emphasizes building relationships with âlocal civil societyâ by âstrengthen[ing] the capacity of the United States to be an effective leader of international efforts to prevent extremism and violent conflict.â
This âcapacityâ also includes 10-year âplanned security assistance.â
The U.S. governmentâs efforts to organize an armed intervention into Haiti over the past year are symbiotic with the GFA. Under the GFA, the U.S. government can negotiate âplanned security assistanceâ with Haiti as part of a 10-year plan, but to do so, Washington wants a nominally elected government.
Blinken explained in a recent official statement that the GFA âunderpinsâ a new strategy and provides an âambitious framework for engaging creativelyâ with the United-Statesâ âglobal partners.â This new strategy is explained in a 2020 document titled âUnited States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stabilityâ (SPCPS), published by the State Department, Defense Department, USAID, and Treasury Department.
The SPCPS meets the GFAâs requirement for Washingtonâs âGlobal Fragility Strategyâ and also outlines the its initial plan for providing 10-year âsecurity-assistanceâ programs to its âpartners.â
Washington wants to improve Haitiâs âgovernance of the security sector,â in addition to âprofessionaliz[ing] partner nation security forces, and build long-term relationships with key host nation security officials consistent with U.S. national security and economic interests.â (emphasis added).
In a follow-up document titled the â10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti,â the U.S. outlined its intent to âintegrate U.S. diplomacy, development, and security-sector engagement in Haiti.â In other words, the State Department, USAID, and the Pentagon â soft power and hard â will work together to implement the Global Fragility Strategy in Haiti.
In a prepared statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Jim Saenz, Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense for Counternarcotics and Stabilization Policy, explained that the âDoDâs role in GFA implementation is to support the efforts of the Department of State as the lead, and the USAID as the lead implementer â to âensure that the 10-year plans âŠalign the relevant goals, objectives, plans, and benchmarks with DoD policy.â
A key feature of Washingtonâs strategy is to intervene in Haitiâs affairs by directing USAID funds to Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) who are open to the U.S. governmentâs âmarket-based approachesâ to âpromoting stabilityâ under a âpartnershipâ imposed by a multinational armed force officially requested by Haitiâs current dictator, Dr. Ariel Henry.
The State Department Implements its 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti
The 10-year Strategic Plan for Haiti outlines the first two phases for the implementation of the Global Fragility Act in Haiti.
During Phase one, the U.S. government outlines a plan to âengage and leverage partners among Haitian civil society and the Haitian National Police (PNH) to inform and implement programming to strengthen citizen security and the rule of law.â
âInitial efforts will focus on key high-crime and high-violence neighborhoods and key transportation and economic hubsâ the plan explains.
The UN Security Councilâs (UNSC) approval of the one-year MSS non-UN mission to Haiti means Phase one is moving ahead.
This UNSC vote comes almost one year after Henryâs initial Oct. 6, 2022 request for âthe immediate deployment of a specialized armed force, in sufficient quantity, to stop throughout the territory the humanitarian crisis caused by, among other things, the insecurity resulting from the criminal actions of armed gangs and their sponsors.â
Kenya is slated to lead the MSS, despite widespread popular and political resistance both in Kenya and Haiti, as well as internationally. Henryâs political rivals â the signatories to the Kingston Joint Declaration and the âJanuary 30th Agreementâ â are opposed to the MSS with Henry in power and insist that a transitional government must be put in place before the MSS enters Haiti.
A Kenyan press report explains that Kenya has said it will focus on guarding key infrastructure â ports, airports, and main roads. Le Nouvelliste, on the other hand, reported that Kenya will deploy a task force to combat armed gangs in Port-au-Prince.
Ecuador and several CARICOM countries have also pledged support and personnel for the Kenyan-led MSS, including Jamaica, the Bahamas, Barbados, and Antigua and Barbuda. The Miami Herald reported that Italy, Spain, Mongolia, Senegal, Belize, Suriname, Guatemala, and Peru have also offered support, although it is unclear what form this will take.
Speaking on Fri., Sep. 22 at the start of a UN meeting in New York, Antony Blinken said the United States would supply ârobust financial and logistical assistanceâ to the MSS, promising US$200 million.
The MSS is an invasion of Haiti that could lead to a brutal 10 year occupation
In essence, Kenya is offering to provide personnel for Phase one of Washingtonâs 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti under the guise of providing security and support to the PNH. It is the spearhead of the GFA âpartnershipâ between Haiti and the U.S..
âThis proposed invasion is different from those of 1994 and 2004,â Kim Ives explained, âwhich involved bonafide UN blue-helmeted âpeacekeepersâ under the control and oversight of the Security Council itself. The MSSâs unprecedented formula would be nominally overseen by Kenya, but actually by the U.S..â
Kenya provides the âBlackwashingâ necessary for the U.S.-led invasion. This approach helps the UN avoid accountability as well. As Ben Norton explained, âIt is a U.S. military intervention, using the UN and Kenya as cover.â
While the MSSâs purported purpose is to combat gangs, the primary goal is to facilitate a controlled changeover from Henryâs embattled regime to another transitional government also beholden to Washington.
Henry has been accused of playing a role in President Jovenel MoĂŻseâs Jul. 7, 2021 assassination as well as backing some of Haitiâs most notorious criminal gangs. Henry was installed as PM by the U.S. government and its allied embassies, known as the âCORE Group,â via a short statement and tweet days after Moiseâs assassination.
Since his selection, Henry has ruled without popular support or a single elected official in his government. He dutifully imposed U.S. policy in Haiti, allowing Haitiâs state institutions to crumble.
The UNSC only approved a one-year mandate for the MSS with renewal reviews after nine months. It is not surprising, however, that Kenyan Foreign Minister Alfred Mutua told the New York Times that their recent assessment âestimated that the project would take three years and require from 10,000 to 20,000 personnel.â He sanguinely explained that he âenvisions some 50 more countries each pledging from 500 to 1,000 officers, so they can achieve the 20,000 or more needed.â
Jake Johnston commented on X (formerly Twitter), writing âMINUSTAH 2.0, the non-UN sequel?â The comparison is as obvious as it is ominous.
MINUSTAH is how the U.S. âoutsourced its control of Haiti,â author and activist Bill Quigley explained. The UN force helped consolidate Washingtonâs post-2004-coup puppet prime minister GĂ©rard Latortue and committed multiple crimes and massacres against the Haitian people. The force varied in size over the 13 years it was deployed in Haiti, averaging about 9,000 military troops and 4,000 police officers from 56 mostly poor countries.
MINUSTAHâs initial mandate was also for only six months, starting in 2004 following the coup against democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The mandate was extended several times. MINUSTAH occupied Haiti for 13 years â until 2017, where it was replaced by another Chapter VII armed force, MINUJUSTH.
Comprised at its peak of about 1,300 police officers, MINUJUSTH remained in Haiti for another two years, until 2019.
Mutuaâs timeline of three years â triple the proposed one year MSS mission timeline â is surely an underestimate. Indeed, in a March 2023 interview, the International Crisis Groupâs Renata Segura was pushed to explain how long the mission would take. She responded âprobably years.â
Five months ago, while discussing a timeline for a multinational intervention force in Haiti, retired Canadian General Tom Lawson told CBC Radio that âweâre not talking a couple of years. Weâre likely talking five to 10, 15 years, because weâre talking about nation-building. Weâre not talking about establishing a safe and secure area for the government now to get to its tasks. Weâre talking about a non-functioning governmentâŠAnd thatâs in terms of â like weâve seen in Afghanistan and Iraq â decades.â
Lawsonâs comments underline that the MSS is an occupation force aiming to set the stage for the GFAâs â10 year security assistanceâ package.
Opposition emerges in Kenya itself
But the MSS is far from a done deal, despite the UNSCâs benediction. It hinges on Kenyaâs leadership, and the Kenyan people may not put up with it.
On Oct. 5, Kim Ives tweeted that Kenyan parliamentarian Babu Owino believes there is a â102 percentâ chance that Kenyan lawmakers will be able to prevent a deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police officers to Haiti, offering a ray of hope for Haiti. Owino shared his views during a Zoom conference with journalists and activists.
But Kenyan President William Rutoâs government can be expected to strike back. In July, Owino was arrested by Kenyan police and detained for three days for speaking out against police brutality.
This is a foreshadowing of the kind of violent oppression of dissent that will result from Kenyan forces occupying Port-au-Prince. Kenyan police have a âculture of internal impunity and criminality, and inadequate internal and external accountability,â explained Peter Kiama, the executive director of Kenyaâs watchdog Independent Medico-Legal Unit. Kenyan police have also been accused of torture and shooting civilians.
As Owino predicted, the invasion plan has encountered pushback. On Oct. 9, the Kenyan High Court blocked Kenyaâs deployment as part of the MSS in Haiti until Oct. 24, 2023, following a petition submitted by the Third Way Alliance political party.
Originally published in Haïti Liberté. The first of two parts.
Source: Popularresistance.org